This paper compares the strategies of Brazil and India in attempting to maximize the benefits of financial globalization while surmounting its challenges. Brazil's approach emerges from a belief, shared across the political spectrum, in the irreducible role of power and politics as drivers of global markets. Brazil's banks and firms also have aspirations to expand abroad, particularly within Latin America, and the state has been willing to support this goal. Beginning in the early 1990s, India's measured moves away from its legacy of socialist planning have yielded strong growth dividends, yet many of its senior economic policymakers remain wary of international financial integration, arguably with cause. With this background, the unexpectedly strong economic and financial performance of emerging economies in both Latin America and Asia during the global credit crisis of 2008-9 opened up new possibilities for both Brazil and India to express their preferences about reforms of the international financial architecture-and receive a respectful hearing from the leaders of long dominant advanced industrial countries, hitherto somewhat dismissive of Brazilian and Indian opinions. We discuss the two countries' sometimes uneven efforts to adjust to their new global reality.
Brave New World? The Politics of International Finance in Brazil and India
Financial globalization presents opportunities and challenges for large emerging markets like Brazil and India. Theoretically, it should reduce the capital costs of productive investment and help improve risk management by diversifying sources of finance and investment opportunities. It should also create incentives to promote domestic financial liberalization. The rapid growth of the global market for financial services also presents opportunities for growth for ambitious firms in these emerging markets. At the same time, financial globalization presents countries like Brazil and India with challenges. It increases the volatility of international capital flows, exposing the inadequacy of both private and state sector risk management skills.. Financial globalization brings multinational firms that may provide new technologies, but may also capture the most lucrative financial market segments and consequently discourage domestic financial sector development. Liberalizing reforms promote new market transactions that may exceed state regulatory capacities, resulting in scandals.
This paper compares the strategies of Brazil and India in attempting to maximize the benefits of financial globalization while surmounting the challenges. Brazil's approach emerges from a belief, shared across the political spectrum, in the irreducible role of power and politics as drivers of global markets. Brazilian administrations champion private enterprise, yet consider monitoring and oversight of the country's overall insertion into global financial markets to be an essential task of government, which ought not to be abdicated to private banks and investors. At the same time, Brazil's banks and firms have aspirations to expand abroad, particularly within Latin America, and the state has been willing to support this goal. The general picture is of relatively cordial relations between public and private financial institutions, and their regulators, and a shared commitment to promote Brazil's international financial and political presence wherever possible. The politics of India's financial opening have been more contentious. Pragmatic conservatives, especially at the Reserve Bank of India -the country's central bankhave advocated a calibrated strategy that has attempted to minimize the pitfalls of financial globalization, while financial liberalizers, often based in the Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance, have sought expeditious opening to global financial markets in pursuit of their objective to make India an important player in the global market for financial services. Complicating any moves to liberalize finance in Indian, however, has been the political weakness of the incumbent United Progressive Alliance (UPA, Congress-Party-led) government, which has frequently been unable to pass the prime minister's preferred macroeconomic and regulatory policies in Parliament. Meanwhile, political leaders in both countries have eagerly seized opportunities for their nations to assume a higher profile in global economic diplomacy and financial governance, although in neither Brazil nor India are the country's strategic goals for international financial reform entirely settled or clear. The paper's first section argues that, just as the global financial crisis that began in the U.S. in 2007 took policymakers in both Brazil and India by surprise, so also did the two countries' unexpectedly rapid recovery from acute financial worries. The net result was a national boost of confidence for Brazilian policymakers, and to a lesser extent for those in India. At the same time, in India the high inflation that partly resulted from counter-cyclical stimulus policies, combined with political paralysis and the loss of reform momentum, has raised concerns about the continuation of India's high growth rates. Section two provides essential background on the financial capabilities and characteristics of Brazil and India. It briefly tours the domestic banking sector, the nature of links with global financial markets, and the evolution of national capital markets for each country. Section three analyzes the recent and novel forays of Brazilian and Indian policymakers into global financial "statecraft," as leaders in the two countries attempt to puzzle out what increments of political "voice" in multilateral fora might accompany their newly discovered international financial capabilities. Our conclusions speculate forward, comparing the different sorts of opportunities and vulnerabilities that the two countries might face as they adjust their national financial strategies in the international political economy.
What doesn't kill you makes you stronger: The global credit crisis as a boost to confidence
Policymakers and pundits expected the global credit crisis that began in United States' mortgage markets in 2007 to hit both Brazil and India hard. The pattern long had been that economic slowdowns in advanced industrial countries battered emerging economies, and the considerable trade and partial financial opening in both Brazil and India since the early 1990s should have made contagion more, not less, likely. But this was not what happened: after sharp initial drops, both countries recovered more rapidly than most of the advanced industrial countries. The Group of Seven (G7) major advanced industrial countries of the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Canada had had cumulative annual gross national product (GDP) growth of 2.4 percent in 2005-7. Their economies contracted 1.9 percent in 2008-9, recovering to 2.5 percent in 2010-2. But Brazil, which had had growth of 4.4 percent going into the crisis, merely reduced its rate of income growth to 2.2 percent, recovering to 5.4 percent in 2010-2. For India, these figures were even better: pre-crisis growth of 9.6 percent, a drop during the global crisis to 6.5 percent, and post-crisis recovery to 8.8 percent GDP growth.
1
These comparatively strong results were surprising to a world, accustomed to viewing emerging market countries as highly vulnerable to financial contagion.
Both countries had activist financial management policies during the crucial period. In Brazil, policymakers had been worried since June about overvaluation of the real, and in July had begun a policy of incremental interest rate cuts to discourage portfolio capital inflows and thus gradually bring the real down. However, the crash of American investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 created a panicky rush of foreign portfolio investors to the exits. In one month, the real fell 30 percent against the U.S. dollar.
2 The Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) therefore reversed course and raised policy interest rates first one, then another, full point in order to attract foreign portfolio capital inflows and stem the currency panic. The BCB thus initially raised interest rates substantially--even though the sole legal mandate for central bank policymaking after early 1999 was to target the inflation rate. At the same time the BCB made available $50 billion in special swap lines to Brazilian firms needing to make good on dollardenominated foreign obligations.
3 Faced with tighter credit in domestic markets in late 2008, international credit options for Brazilian firms also shrunk. By early 2009, many firms could find neither domestic nor international affordable borrowing options. To stabilize the domestic economy, Finance Minister Guido Mantega transferred $58 billion from the Treasury to the national industrial development bank, BNDES, and another state-owned bank, CEF, whose main task was residential mortgage lending. 4 This money allowed the BNDES to loan directly to large firms, and to on-loan funds to smaller, regional banks serving smaller and mid-sized businesses. Later, the government also transferred shares of the state-owned oil giant, Petrobrás, to BNDES, to augment its capital base, in accordance with updated Basle III rules on bank capital adequacy then being negotiated multilaterally in the light of the international financial crisis. In addition, the BCB then began lowering interest rates once more, forced to play a delicate balancing game between maintaining rates high enough to avoid a panicked capital outflow, but yet low enough to counteract the global credit contraction. In the judgment of most market observers, Finance Minister Mantega and BCB President Henrique Meirelles, operating independently but collaboratively, successfully pulled off this feat.
The Reserve Bank of India, like the Banco Central do Brasil, reacted to the immediate threat in the third quarter of 2008 by cutting interests rates by 100 basis points (that is, by a full percentage point). The other rapid response to the global financial crisis was a very substantial fiscal stimulus. Central to this package were provisions for tax relief and increased expenditures on public works to generate employment, particularly the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Also during 2008, the Government of India implemented debt waivers for farmers, and the government augmented the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission, 5 providing for an average pay raise of 21 percent the central government's five million workers, to be backdated to January 1, 2006. The pay increase cost an estimated $3.6 billion in 2008-09 and even more in the following year.
6 However, it is important to recognize that much of the fiscal stimulus came before the gravity of the international crisis was known. For instance, the loan waivers were passed in the spring of 2008 and the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations were formally accepted in August 2008. These were done in an election year, more to improve the government's political prospects. So there was a coincidence of electoral populism with the need for a stimulus in the wake of the global crisis (which brought more stimulus).
Thus, between mid-2008 and early 2009, policymakers in both Brazil and India managed to design and implement significant and fairly successful counter-cyclical policies. By March 2009 Brazil's authorities had cut the main policy interest rate by 1.0 percent and created a fiscal stimulus of about 0.5 percent of GDP. India's cumulative interest rate cuts amounted to 2.5 percent and its fiscal stimulus to was equivalent to Brazil's as a share of national income.
7 While the advanced industrial countries had negative growth, these two large emerging economies suffered only a reduced rate of positive growth, returning in 2010 to strong growth once again.
There were of course some adverse consequences of the extraordinary macroeconomic stimulus efforts. Brazil had long had high interest rates, and the even higher rates attracted vigorous capital inflows. Even after crisis-related interest rate reductions, both Brazil's nominal and real interest rates remained among the world's highest, as shown in Figure 1 . Thus, in the context of inflation averaging around 6 percent since 1999, the policy interest rate averaged 17.22 percent between 1999 and 2010, with a high of 45 percent in early 1999 (immediately following the floating of the real and an historic low of 8.75 percent in July 2009. As of this writing in late March 2012, the SELIC is at 9.75 percent. The international market turmoil of 2008 through the present also led Brazil's Finance Ministry to implement a series of graduated capital controls, including new taxes on foreign purchases of public bonds, the most liquid asset in Brazilian markets, a large share of which trade daily in the "overnight" market, as well as additional taxes on foreign purchases of various other Brazilian financial assets. As it did with interest rate policies, the BCB adjusted the forms and levels of temporary capital controls frequently, in the hopes of staying one step ahead of the markets. <Figure 1 about here> For Indian policymakers, the largest adverse impacts of its apparently successful crisis management have been a sharp rise in public debt, a rise of inflation, and in 2012 a slowdown in economic growth, in part as a consequence of historically high interest rates As a consequence of the stimulus package, the central government's gross fiscal deficit increased from 2. 9 While a growth rate over 6 percent looked disappointing from within the country, when combined with India's size it raised India's profile among worried economic policymakers worldwide.
<Figure 2 about here>
The unexpectedly successful adjustment of these and other "emerging market" countries to the global credit crisis caused policymakers and opinion leaders in each to conceive of themselves as "emerging powers," or countries with an increasingly consequential and independent role to play on the global stage. Somewhat forgotten perhaps were such facts as the $30 billion emergency currency swap line the U.S. Federal Reserve Board made available to Brazil (along with similar amounts to South Korea, Mexico, and Singapore) in early 2009, which helped to stabilize the currency, or the U.S.' massive global stimulus package of $841.2 billion (5.9 percent of United States' GDP) by March 2009, which was significantly more important to the world economy than Brazil's $8.6 billion or India's $6.5 billion stimulus packages as of the same date.
10 One important result of the global financial crisis was a boost to national self-confidence among senior economic policymakers in these and other large developing countries, who quite naturally-if not necessarily correctly--attributed their countries' relatively good performance to their own efforts.
The ad hoc construction of two mixed public-private financial "models": Some background This paper mainly addresses the experiences of Brazil and India since the global credit crisis of the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, and the ways in which their leaders have begun to think about their countries' future roles in the international political economy of financial and monetary relations. Yet in order to understand the options taken by the two countries' governments, as well as the political meanings attached to those choices by policymakers and their relevant publics, we must first review the overall empirical conditions of financial markets and financial regulation in these two large emerging democracies as they entered the new century. Despite the notable differences described below, in each case what we have is a mix of public and private banking institutions, purely prudential with strategicallymotivated financial regulation, newly vibrant private capital markets, and ambitious but also cautious plans to enter and compete in global financial markets.
11 This section compares the current history and performance of the banking sector, foreign financial links (including inward foreign direct investment, foreign borrowing, and portfolio equity inflows), and the capital markets. The order of presentation within the discussion of each of the three financial components is roughly chronological. In both cases, banks have been important for the longest time during the period following the Second World War. Large quantities of foreign private financing for domestic investment is more recent, dating from the late 1950s in Brazil, but only the 1980s in India. Each country began significant regulatory reforms of the domestic capital markets in the early 1990s, leading to an explosion in equity markets over the past decade and a half. The section closes with comparisons of current contentious issues in the financial regulation/modernization and the institutional forms of each country's current international financial insertion.
Brazil
Going into the financial crisis, as of about early 2008, Brazil had a vibrant banking sector, bifurcated into commercial and development institutions. In 1994-5, a decade and a half previously, the Plano Real stabilization program had triumphally ended decades of high to hyperinflation. But price stabilization paradoxically also led directly to a massive domestic banking crisis, because Brazil's banks had adapted their competitive strategies entirely to operating in a very high inflation environment, and therefore found themselves bereft of their major profit strategies with inflation's definitive end. [cites] . The implicit deal between the government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the financial sector was that the state would bail out the banks, and in return the financial sector would not protest unduly over liberalizing reforms, including ones that eased rules of entry for both new domestic competitors and foreign banks. After spending the equivalent of [CK] percent of national income between 1995 and about 1997, Brazil's financial sector emerged strong and surprisingly healthy.
In 1999 Brazilian commercial banks were formally allowed to become multi-purpose financial institutions, ratifying a de facto shift that already largely had occurred. Large banks combined traditional banking activities of deposit-taking and the extension of short-term working capital loans with savings banking, investment banking, stock broking, mutual fund management, automobile and machinery leasing, and sometimes related services such as life insurance or even travel agencies. A wave of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector began in the early 2000s and continued unabated through the global turmoil. Brazil today has the largest banks in Latin America (six of the top ten, including all of the top four-cite?) Moreover state, national private, and foreign banks coexist in a relatively stable ratio: foreign commercial banks, who have been largely free to operate in the country for more than a century, have by no means out-competed Brazilian banks. Among the top four banks in Brazil by either assets or market capitalization, the Banco do Brasil is a public bank, Itaú-Unibanco and Bradesco are privately-owned, and Santander is a transnational bank from Spain. Commercial bank deposits were about 41 percent of GDP in 2000, and 61 percent in 2009, closely equivalent to their levels in India (see Table 1 ).
< Table 1 about here > The other aspect of banking markets is Brazil's public sector development banks, which are enormous, by most measures successful, and help design and implement strategic direction for the entire economy. The BNDES provides most long-term credit to firms, as it has done for decades, dealing directly with big corporates, while also on-lending very significant resources to commercial banks to loan to their smaller clients. The total BNDES loan portfolio in 2009, as a power point presentation in both Portuguese and English on the bank's website in March 2012 proudly announced, was larger than that of the combined loan books of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Andean Development Corporation in Latin America that year [cite] . Most residential mortgage credit in the economy derives from the CEF (Federal Savings Bank), another public sector giant.
Brazil's history with foreign investors is long and frequently conflictual, yet has also often been mutually satisfying. Brazilian economic policymakers have tended to believe themselves well able to manage foreign money inflows. Thus developmentalist President Kubitschek in the late 1950s proposed to achieve "fifty years [development] in five" through the tripé [tripod] model of cooperation among public, foreign, and local private capital in greenfield investment projects in sectors prioritized by the state. FDI inflows in the 1950s through the 1970s were substantially higher as a share of GDP than they were in India during the same period, as can be seen from Table 2 . FDI contributed strongly to growth spurts in the 1950s and again during the "Brazilian economic miracle" of about 1968 through the mid-1970s, during which industrial growth was over 12 percent annually. In the 1970s Brazilian policymakers took advantage of sovereign borrowing from international banks recycling petrodollars on favorable terms. Thus in 1980, FDI was 11 percent of GDP, about the same level as in 1970, but foreign debt liabilities had more than doubled, rising from 17 to 40 percent of GDP.
< Table 2 about here > Worth noting is the fact that many Brazilian economists, leaning politically both left and right, still believe that Brazil's 1980s international debt crisis didn't result from mistakes their government made, as the Finance Ministry carefully had programmed total national borrowing so as to avoid currency, interest rates, or maturity mismatches. In their view the crisis instead can be traced to imprudent Mexicans, who defaulted in August 1982, and to the herd behavior of global banks, who subsequently pulled their credit lines throughout Latin America. The vision of the state as a successful tamer of foreign capital has remained more or less intact for decades. Nonetheless in the slow growth and difficult macroeconomic scenario of the 1980s, foreign capital stayed away. By 1990, the stock of FDI had shrunk to only 6 percent of GDP, while outstanding international loans were down to 25 percent.
In the 1990s Brazilian policymakers resolved to engage actively with global capital markets once again, this time focusing on foreign institutional investors. The flagship development bank, the BNDES, already had developed experience as an institutional equity investor. It had reacted to the plight of Brazilian firms suffering during the 1980s by initiating equity-for-debt swaps, whereby the BNDES got non-voting shares and the firms got their local bank debts written down. Policymakers in the 1990s called on the BNDES to run the large privatization program of the 1990s, which ultimately raised about $87 billion, selling undercapitalized and sometimes insolvent state firms in electricity, transportation, telecommunications, plus several public banks run by individual state governments. The larger privatizations were mostly by closed-bid auction, but with the understanding that the shares subsequently would trade on the stock exchange. The process was made easier by the fact that for decades Brazil's blue chip stocks, those most highly regarded by the public as safe and liquid investments, had been the minority and non-voting shares of state firms, including the oil giant, Petrobrás, and the Banco do Brasil. In 1995, President Cardoso 's government convinced Congress to alter legislation to allow for foreign investment in public utilities sectors. New legislation also allowed as "privatization currency" a host of "rotten bonds," the debt securities of struggling state firms, many of which initially had been issued to the public as collateral for forced loans (that is, one-time-only special tax levies on businesses and higher income citizens which the government would repay after five or fifteen years). Through these moves Brazil's government sought to expand participation in the equity market by both foreigners and Brazilians. In the end, foreign capital entering to participate in privatizations was less of a boon for the stock markets than had been anticipated: by 2000, foreign portfolio holdings of Brazilian shares was only 1 percent of national income. More foreign capital had chosen the direct investment route: in 2000, the stock of FDI had again risen to 18 percent of GDP.
The moves to stimulate domestic shareholding looked more successful: in the decade of the 1990s stock market capitalization expanded from a tenth to more than a third of GDP, as shown in Table 1 above. Other corners of the capital market also gained liquidity. By 2000, domestic private bonds accounted for 0.5 percent and public debt bonds for over 23 percent of GDP. However there was a big problem, from the viewpoint of Brazilian capital markets professionals. Brazil's top firms were electing to exit local markets and raise funds abroad instead. By the millennium, Brazilian firms, including well-known state enterprises, had a stock of international bond liabilities worth almost 3 percent of GDP, and were raising significant equity capital through initial public offerings (IPOs) listed abroad. Thus in the 2000s one of Brazil's most important financial reform initiatives originated with private market actors at the Stock Exchange of São Paulo (Bovespa). The idea was that the most important barrier to equity markets was a backward looking corporate culture that improperly rewarded family shareholders at the expense of outsiders. In 2001 Bovespa inaugurated a new market segment, the Novo Mercado, based on Germany's Neuer Markt, in which firms would voluntarily sign up to a list of additional rules, the most significant being promises of enhanced transparency in balance sheet reporting and greatly expanded minority shareholder rights such as a cap on the percentage of non-voting shares issued and "tag along" rights during mergers and acquisitions. In the first year, only three [ck] firms chose to list their IPOs in this segment, and the skeptics were legion. But by 2006, many more venerable firms had signed up, and in 2010, the magic number of 100 firms who voluntarily had chosen to list in the Novo Mercado segment was passed. In 2010, each of the country's two major exchanges "demutualized," or transformed themselves into publicly traded companies, contributing to Brazil having the third largest sum, worldwide, of funds raised in initial public offerings (IPOs) of corporate stock in that year [cite] . In early 2011, the country's main equity exchange, Bovespa (the Stock Exchange of São Paulo) and its main derivatives exchange, BM&F (Commodities and Futures Exchange), merged to form the fourth largest exchange by market capitalization worldwide [get figure].
Through these regulatory changes and resultant market expansion Brazil, which only in the mid-1990s had ended decades of high to very high inflation, became the darling of global corporate governance and social responsibility reformers, at the OECD, the World Bank, and transnational finance forums worldwide. [cites or details?] The bulk of the implementation of these capitalist reforms occurred under the left-leaning governments of Presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff (2011-present), whose senior economic policymakers were supportive of these private-sector-led reform initiatives, if often engaged with other priorities.
In the new decade of the twenty-teens conflicts over financial and monetary regulation have become overtly politicized in a way not seen in Brazil in many years, even during the years of several thousand percent annual price inflation in the early 1990s, prior to the Plano Real in 1994-5. Between 1995 and early 1999, Brazil had a quasi-fixed exchange rate, which the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) allowed to fluctuate within a narrow band. The exchange rate served as an inflation-anchor for the currency. But Brazil was hit by financial contagion in 1998, originating with the East Asian financial crisis, but proximately arriving as a consequence of Russia's knock-on crisis in August 2008, which international investors responded to by dumping portfolio holdings in other emerging markets, in order to free up enough funds to cover these losses without incurring the wrath of their home country regulators. In October 2008, Brazil received a preemptive loan of [CK] from the IMF, arranged with active U.S. support, which allowed its senior economic policymakers to arrange for an orderly transition to a floating rate the following January. Another IMF loan of [CK] followed in February. On the adoption of a floating exchange rate, the BCB switched to an explicit inflation-targeting regime for monetary policy, requiring tight monetary policy much of the time. In practice, this has meant that Brazil, which historically has had high nominal and real interest rates, has had extraordinarily high interest rates from 1999 to the present, as discussed above.
The partisan political conflict just referred to has centered around interest rate policies. One political problem of the center-right coalition centered around the PSDB, party of former President Cardoso and of perennial presidential hopeful and former governor of the state of São Paulo, economist José Serra, is that they have lost a significant portion of the country's middle class and its business community, their natural constituencies, to the PT of Presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. Under the PT (the Workers' Party, historically associated with a radical left critique of capitalism but infinitely pragmatic in office), economic growth has been steady and inflation low and stable-most probably because these leftist leaders have left unchanged the credible macroeconomic policies of the preceding PSDB governments. In preparation the midterm elections of 2012 and the upcoming presidential election of 2014, the PSDB has taken on the issues of Brazil's high interest rate and equally high spread between banks' deposit and lending rates, which was 54.4 percent in 1999 and has come down to "only" 31.3 percent in 2010-which remains extraordinarily high in comparative perspective. We have, in other words, the interesting spectacle of the moderate right accusing the moderate left of running monetary policy that is too tight. A survey of independent economists published in March 2012 expressed the consensus opinion that monetary policy (as represented by the 9.75 percent SELIC rate) was a bit too loose in light of looming inflationary pressures [cite] . The BCB is formally subordinate to the Finance Ministry, although its president in recent decades has had considerable operational autonomy. The government of President Dilma, however, has put much of its recent macroeconomic focus on bringing down Brazil's strong currency, for which lower interest rates are helpful.
India
The Indian banking system on the eve of the international credit crisis of 2008-9 was both relatively solid and rather stolid. Notwithstanding significant regulatory liberalization since the early 1990s, approximately 74 percent of banking assets remained with wholly-state-owned institutions, still collectively known as the "nationalized banks." The largest is the State Bank of India (SBI), which was created in 1955 by nationalizing the Imperial Bank, a government bank under British rule whose history to prior to nationalization often parallels that of the Banco do Brasil. In 2010, the SBI held X percent of banking assets. [ck EIU for figures]. Fourteen more banks were nationalized in 1969 as Indira Gandhi split from conservative regional leaders within the Congress Party and assumed a leftist position in order to build popular appeal for her new party and solidify communist support for its government.
Thereafter new commercial bank entrants were strictly limited, such that the only attractive area for them was as "boutique" banks, serving specialized, upscale urban clientele. Indian also had a range of publicly owned development financial institutions, including several large industrial development banks, which sometimes promoted long-term, productive investment, but also were known for favoring generous loans to politically well-connected industrialists and de facto bankrupt manufacturing firms in order to avoid job losses in politically-sensitive regions. In 2000, India's central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) permitted these state-owned development banks to transform themselves into universal banks, offering a range of services to their corporate clients,. Two of the large former development banks, the ICICI and the IDBI , supported their moves into intermediate and short-term corporate financing and retail loans and deposits by issuing bonds, debentures, and equity shares to the public. In contrast to Brazil, India's public sector banks still have a social mission in the form of a mandate to make 40 percentof their loans to the so-called "priority sector," including small businesses, agriculture, and education. . They are able to do this because, first, they need not produce regular dividends for shareholders, and second, they face only limited competitionn with new local private and foreign bank entrants, who instead have pursued a largely distinct, and previously underserved, client base.
In the years following independence, Indians were skeptical of finance and markets more generally. By the time of the Second Five Year Plan, India's Planning Commission whose establishment was supported by Indian business, 12 had articulated an economic strategy premised on the idea that markets couldn't be relied upon to efficiently allocate investment. Therefore, scientifically-developed targets and incentives were needed to ensure that "strategic sectors" received proper investment. Lack of faith in markets was even more clearly manifest in the creation of the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI), a regulator that determined the price and number of shares that companies could issue through IPOs. From the late 1960s, businesspersons labored under two additional onerous laws. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act(MRTP), 1969, imposed strict and low limits on the total size of firms in the interest of fairness to all, and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1974 applied to foreign exchange the rationing logic of the CCI, perhaps with somewhat greater justification. Government licenses were needed for even small shifts in business strategy, including importing a component or expanding a factory. Compared to their Brazilian counterparts, Indian economic policymakers were notably less sanguine of their ability to manipulate foreign (or domestic) capital for the national public good.
Since independence, India's balance of payments has been fragile, with unmanageable deficits periodically met through loans from the international financial institutions. Although Indian borrowing from the IMF and World Bank was never outstanding as a share of national income, it has frequently been notable in absolute terms and as a share of these institutions' total resources. In 1991 a series of bad economic conditions (including combined central and state government fiscal deficits averaging more than 10 percent of GDP over the previous five years, current account deficits reaching 3. percent of GDP in 1990-91, the 1991 Gulf crisis, and declining foreign reserves covering just two weeks of exports by June 1991) produced a financial crisis that catalyzed a series of liberalizing reforms. 13 Trade reforms announced in July 1991 abolished import licensing on virtually all intermediate and capital goods. The rupee was devalued by 18 percent, a huge change in the Indian context. Measures were initiated to remove foreign exchange controls on current account transactions, and on August 20, 1994, India announced that the rupee was fully convertible on the current account. The 1991 crisis began a process that eliminated export controls and gradually reduced India's high tariffs. On July 24, 1991 a new Industrial Policy statement curtailed India's investment licensing regime, eliminated many of the restrictions on firms under the MRTP, and permitted automatic approval for foreign direct investment up to 51% equity in joint ventures.
In this context two financial sector reforms stand out: the 1992 abolition of the CCI and the passage of the the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act(SEBI) giving legal authority to India's first independent regulatory agency, and the 1999 substitution of the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) for FERA. In both cases there were significant changes to rules and institutions and a fundamental changes in regulatory ideology. Whereas the CCI had dictated the prices and number of shares firms could issue for IPOs, SEBI managers did not determine market outcomes but focused on the procedure of market transactions with the hopes of creating efficient markets. Whereas the CCI represented the government's distrust of markets, SEBI represented its new objective of developing the country's capital markets so that they might become a vital source of industrial finance. Under SEBI, in 1992, foreign institutional investors were for the first time allowed to invest in India's stock markets, and restrictions on foreign portfolio equity investment were incrementally liberalized in the years that followed. The government removed restrictions on private sector mutual funds and allowed foreign companies to set up their own mutual funds and provide financial services as merchant banks. Figures show consistent and substantial financial deepening. In 1960, for example, credit to the private sector from formal banks (as opposed to informal moneylenders) was under 8 percent of GDP, but by 2008 it was almost 48 percent. Stock market capitalization rose even more dramatically, from 3 percent of national income in 1980, and 10 percent in 1990, just prior to the period of financial liberalization, to 173 percent of GDP in 2008. Reforms led to the expansion of India's market for public debt, but the market for corporate debt remains woefully small as must corporations issue debt through private placement.
The major financial policy debates in contemporary India are heated, but do not seem to have become identified with partisan electoral politics, even to the limited extent that this has occurred in Brazil. The debate is mainly among government regulators themselves, with the Ministry of Finance, academic economists closely linked to it, and the already internationalized segments of the Indian markets tending to favor more rapid external financial liberalization, seeing it as the best way to promote greater efficiency and innovation domestically. In fact, a small but significant public-private coalition dreams of building on India's strengths in information technology and English language skills to transform Mumbai into a significant international financial center.
14 Meanwhile, the RBI, scholars in its ambit, and more traditional institutions such as the nationalized banks point to India's escape from major episodes of international financial contagion in the 1990s and 2000s, attributing this result precisely to India's cautious "calibrated" approach emphasizing financial stability in an era of volatile global markets. 15 The RBI-centered coalition would like to promote India as a different type of financial model, one emphasizing stability, caution, and an important oversight role for the state [cites] .
Comparing contemporary levels of financial internationalization
In the end, levels of international financial integration have jumped in both countries. In 1970 Brazil's ratio of foreign financial liabilities to GDP was 27 percent, as compared to only 17 percent in India (see Table 2 above). But in 2009 these ratios were closely equivalent, at 68 and 66 percent, respectively. Foreign participation in India's equity markets grew briskly to 2000, expanding from less than half a percent of GDP in 1990 to 4 percent in 2000, but exploding thereafter, and reaching 32 percent in 2009. Combining figures from different sources, this suggests that as of 2008 about 18 percent (by value) of shares in India were foreign-owned, as compared to a similar 22 percent in Brazil. In a notable shift from earlier eras, the latest available figures, from 2011:Q3, show a much higher proportion of private sector borrowing (via bank loans and international bond issues) than sovereign borrowing in both countries, as shown in Table 3 . In Brazil, the share of government debt in the total foreign debt of $326.6 billion was about 24 percent, while in India the public sector was responsible for only 13 percent of a total external debt of $400.3 billion. In Brazil, approximately a quarter of foreign borrowing is in the form of intercompany loans, from the headquarters of a transnational firm to an affiliate abroad. Some share of this may reflect the so-called "carry trade," in which money is borrowed relatively cheaply in international markets and then invested in higher-yielding instruments, often government bonds, by the Brazilian subsidiary, which in most cases is not subject to the capital controls faced by foreign institutional investors. In India, about a fifth of the debt is in the form of short-term deposits, mostly available only to non-resident Indians (NRIs). NRI deposits now are now large, and make an important contribution to the balance of payments. Yet they also are surely worrisome. Is it really true that NRI deposits in a crisis would be significantly more "loyal" capital than ordinary foreign portfolio deposits? In both of these cases, potential external vulnerabilities derive from private sector foreign borrowing, not sovereign debt, a circumstance that may make external vulnerabilities more difficult for national governments to manage.
< Table 3 about here >
Heady days: Early ventures into global governance and financial statecraft
Economic policymakers and financial regulators in both countries have been justifiably pleased with their countries' relatively easy ride during the financial crisis, giving them the option of engaging in what Kathryn Hochstatler (2012) aptly has termed the "politics of comparatively good times," a condition which allows incumbent administrations to see themselves as clever vis-à-vis both their home political oppositions at the domestic level, which is Hochstatler's focus, and with respect to the traditional postwar major powers, the advanced industrial democracies, at the international level. 16 In addition, behind this recent relative success lie approximately two decades of financial modernization, expansion, and gradual and thus far mostly encouraging engagement with global financial markets-once again in both countries. This is a potentially heady mixture for policymakers in countries such as Brazil and India.
The first recent venture into attempting to influence global economic governance rules for both countries was their formation of a negotiating group with South Africa, which evolved into the trade Group of Twenty (trade G20, developing country G20) developing countries which attempted to forge common positions in the World Trade Organization, especially at the Cancún Ministerial meeting of 2003. The U.S. initially organized the other Group of Twenty (finance G20, large economies G20) in 1999 as the East Asian financial crisis was winding down. The finance G20 widened the group of countries consulted about reforms of the global financial architecture beyond the usual major advanced democracies. Large or strategic emerging economies such as China, Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia, Argentina, and Saudi Arabia were invited to join the G8 powers in deliberations on global financial reform. However, the main technical committees tasked with suggesting bank regulatory reforms were associated with the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), also created in the wake of the Asian crisis. The FSF, which had as developing country members only Singapore and Hong Kong, met in Basle, Switzerland, at the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the central bankers' bank, in contrast to the finance G20, which had no permanent home. Although finance ministers of the new G20 issued a series of recommendations for reforms of the global financial architecture, and continued to meet periodically, seasoned diplomats and international observers did not have high hopes for it.
Yet when the financial crisis in the United States that had begun in 2007 began to escalate following the failure of Lehman Brothers, President George W. Bush's economic advisors concluded that the resources of the traditional post-war powers would be insufficient to carry off a coordinated stimulus sufficient to halt the panic, which was spreading globally. The most convenient means of including the major emerging market countries was to convene the first ever heads of state Summit meeting of the finance G20, henceforth known as the large economies' G20. Shortly thereafter the FSF expanded to include all finance G20 members, renaming itself the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Along with the pressure on senior Brazilian and Indian politicians and economic policymakers to deal with the expanding global credit crisis from the third quarter of 2008 thus also came new opportunities to participate in global governance. Although the IBSA group and the trade G20 have continued to exist, the spread of the 2007-9 financial crisis globally has elevated the finance G20-hereafter "the" G20--to a much greater importance, both on the international stage and in the perception of Brazilian and Indian leaders themselves.
Meanwhile, since 2006 Russia had been promoting meetings of informal meetings of diplomats from the four countries selected in 2001 by Goldman Sachs' Jim O'Neill as large emerging markets for investors to watch: the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Russia hosted the first BRICs leaders' summit in April 2009, where the four agreed to jointly pressure the dominant industrial economies for greater voting shares in the International Monetary Fund; upward adjustments for China, India, and Brazil followed later that year. Russia's Fund quota had already slightly exceeded its proportion of the global economy, but it proved willing to support the others in this goal. Although the BRICs group-since 2011 BRICS, with the addition of South Africa-has had too many differences of domestic political regimes and geostrategic goals to enable them to forge common positions on most political issues, they are united in the broad strategic goal of desiring a more multipolar world less dominated by the United States and Western Europe, and on the related international monetary and financial goal of reducing the dominance of the U.S. dollar and North Atlantic states in global financial markets and governance. Thus the BRICs have sometimes been an effective lobby within the G20. In 2009 they made it clear that they would not agree to raising additional resources for the IMF to use in responding to the global financial crisis until the other members of the G20 acceded to their request for greater developing country representation in the Fund. In early 2012, once again, Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde has requested an increase of $600 billion, to bring total IMF resources available to respond to the on-going Eurozone sovereign debt crisis up to $1 trillion. The BRICS have made their assent conditional on a further increment to their voting power within the Fund. At each of their biannual meetings, first of finance ministers and then of political leaders, the BRICs have signaled their intent to move away from the use of the U.S. dollar, most recently by pledging to transform, albeit incrementally, their trade and credit arrangements with one another from USD to local currency invoicing terms.
Under the center-right administrations of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , post-inflationary Brazil had actively engaged with most of the world, traveling frequently to Europe and the U.S., as well as around Latin America and to Lusophone Africa. The Cardoso administration laid the groundwork of the Mercosur (Common Market of the South) process, which included Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, into a regional integration process for all of South America, formalized in 2006 [ck] into an organization now known as Unasur (Union of South American Nations). The president and his senior spokespersons were always impeccably sober in their public dealings. Under the center-left administrations of his successor President Luíz Inácio (Lula) da Silva, Brazilian leaders focused on forming "SouthSouth" alliances with other developing countries, including its South American neighbors, East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. President Lula and senior policymakers became quite bold in some of their public pronouncements, in some cases causing the more traditional diplomats and politicians and pundits of the center-right embarrassment. In July 2008 President Lula bragged that the financial tsunami that had hit the United States and other developed nations was only a small wave "not big enough to surf on" in Brazil. In mid-March 2009 finance minister Mantega promoted Brazilian public debt securities as a "safe alternative" to U.S. Treasury bonds. Later that month, during a state visit to Brazil by the ardent multilateralist, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the President publicly blamed the financial crisis that had punished "black and brown people" on "white, blue-eyed bankers." In June 2009, foreign minister Celso Amorím imprudently declared to the press that the G8 was "dead," leading to a subsequent public rebuke by Brazil's BRICs partner, Russia-also a G8 member. None of these statements had lasting repercussions, although a Turkish-Brazilian effort in May 2010 to broker a deal between Iran and Western critics of its nuclear program provoked a furious public scolding from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Brazil's explicitly financial international initiatives have been widely reported, though not always successful. After the IMF announced in April 2009 that it would issue its first international bond offering, the Chinese, Brazilians, and Indians all pointedly subscribed for large amounts: $30 billion, $10 billion, and $10 billion, respectively, allowing President Lula numerous opportunities at home to point out proudly that Brazil had, under his watch, been transformed from an international debtor to a creditor. His finance minister, Guido Mantega, in September 2010 was the first senior policymaker to publicly name the rising tension over global imbalances-either caused by or reflected in "weak" and "strong" currencies-as a "currency war." On the strength of Brazil's vocal criticism of countries that manipulated their exchange rates to generate a trade advantage, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner journeyed to Brazil in hopes of securing a joint U.S.-Brazil statement criticizing countries that intervened to keep their currencies undervalued. But joint statements with the U.S. criticizing China didn't fit with official Brazil's new self-image, so Mantega instead let it be known that, in Brazil's view, the U.S. was equally guilty of contributing to global imbalances by loose monetary policy, which generated low interest rates and put pressure on countries like Brazil fighting excessive capital inflows. Later Mantega went further, declining to criticize BRIC partner China at all, while complaining persistently about the U.S. as a source of global imbalances. This stance was somewhat disingenuous, since a coordinated stimulus sufficient to rescue the global economy surely required a major effort by the U.S.
Indian prime ministers and senior economic policymakers also have participated enthusiastically in global economic fora, from the trade and finance G20s, to the IBSA and BRICs groupings, to high profile transnational gatherings such as the World Economic Forum at Davos. But their public pronouncements have been considerably more circumspect than Brazil's over the past few years. In fact, Indian business leaders, rather than politicians or senior economic policymakers, have been the main source of self-confident statements about India's role in the 21 st century world. For example, Lakshmi Mittal, CEO of Arcelor Mittal, contributed an opinion piece to the Economist in 2008 arguing that the global economy was at the point of a major power shift toward emerging economies, and commenting that "[t]he developed world should be thankful for this trend. As consumers in the advanced economies retrench from unsustainable levels-American consumer spending alone accounts for 21% of global GDPshoppers in the BRICs will take up the slack."
17 Indian politicians have not entirely refrained from international pontificating. In the context of U.S.-China trade disputes that clouded the September 2009 meeting of the G20 in Pittsburgh, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh lectured India's G20 partners on the evils of protectionism. In April 2010 finance minister Pranab Mukherjee flatly rejected Prime Minister Gordon Brown's proposal for a tax on all financial transactions worldwide (a version of the "Tobin tax") proposal of Gordon Brown at the G20 meeting. Brown's idea had been to use the monies raised to "reform the global financial system," which many of those present understood as code for providing additional resources for compensating Western European governments for the money they had spent and would spend on rescuing their troubled banks. Mukherjee made clear that any extra taxes on Indian banks would need to go towards extending basic financial services to the millions of unbanked poor in India. In November 2011, India agreed to join China in a formal statement critical of the advanced economies for their sins of macroeconomic mismanagement.
Nonetheless, as compared to Brazilian leaders during these same years, Indian leaders have been less obviously self-confident-and even their publicly-announced goals for the late March 2012 BRICS summit in New Delhi have been modest. Yet they have enthusiastically participated in the various incremental financial projects coming out of the sessions, such as the late 2011 announcement that the five countries would begin listing stock index futures and other basic derivatives on one another's stock exchanges. In February 2012 India formally proposed that the BRICS establish a development bank, though a conflict quickly broke out over the Indian plan for a rotating chairmanship and China's insistence that, as the major provider of funds, it's nationals should permanently head such an institution.
One sees, thus, a subtle contrast between Brazil and India in the degree to which each has sought to employ its newfound international financial prominence to promote itself as a global player, with Brazil more obviously enthusiastic about playing such a role. Meanwhile, the BRICS group has not found a great deal of common ground on international political issues, but has continued to slowly deepen financial cooperation. China, of course, clearly has more options and freedom to lead than any of its four BRICS partners. For example, in 2009, both Brazil and India saw China displace the U.S. as their principal trading partner, and both countries worry about structural trade deficits with China-as does South Africa. The members of the group share, however, a common goal of "international financial reform," the core definition of which is greater influence for themselves in multilateral financial governance. In 2012, BRICs acted jointly in the G20 finance ministers' meetings in late February. They insisted, in this case in concert with the U.S. and others, that Western Europe (Germany) would need to contribute further funds before they would agree (in their capacity as G20 members) to increase IMF resources to the total level of $1 trillion, as sought by MD Lagarde to deal with continuing Eurozone crisis. In addition, the BRICS explicitly sought further quota readjustment in their favor in advance of joining the consensus to increase IMF resources.
Conclusions: Strengths, vulnerabilities, and cautions going forward
Brazil and India's financial liberalization has led to their increasing integration with global financial markets. As they have become more integrated, these large resourceful countries have become more important actors influencing the decisions shaping the evolution of these markets. Three challenges confront Brazil and India if they are to succeed in creating global financial institutions and policies that support their long-term developmental goals. First, can they overcome their differences and work together to achieve their joint objectives? Their inability to overcome their difference during the Doha round of negotiations at the WTO highlights the formidable challenges that they face. Second, will they overreach in their demands for reform? Brazil has shown periodic bravado that exceeds its ability to deliver outcomes on the international level. India has been more sober, but its vulnerabilities, including its rivalry with China, limit its ability to achieve its objectives. Finally, while Brazil and India have achieved remarkable economic success in the last twenty years, exercising influence at the global level requires reaching agreements with the still powerful countries of Europe and the United States. If their ascendance leads to refusal to compromise with Europe and the United States, Brazil and India's overreach may lead to a stalemate that would prevent international negotiations from achieving needed reforms.
We end our analysis on a somewhat ambivalent note. It would be comforting to conclude that, if countries like Brazil and India play their cards right, they could negotiate reforms that produce global financial markets that are potentially somewhat more efficient and equitable for all. But also plausible is the more pessimistic assessment that the governments of Brazil and India, along with those of their fellow BRICS countries, are playing with fire in their attempts to dethrone the central, nay the hegemonic, role played by the U.S. currency, U.S. financial markets, and more or less collaborative financial governance by the advanced economies since the mid-20 th century. It is safe to say that neither Brazil nor India-nor of course the larger international political economy--would be well-served by heightened international financial turmoil. Our net hope, therefore, is for continued incremental, but not dramatic, change. 
